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ABSTRACT
Many economic and social systems are essentially large multi-agent systems. By means of computational
modeling, the complicated behavior of such systems can be investigated. Modeling a multi-agent system
as an evolutionary agent system, several important choices have to be made for evolutionary operators.
Especially, it is to be expected that evolutionary dynamics substantially depend on the selection scheme.
We therefore investigate the inuence of evolutionary selection mechanisms on a fundamental problem: the
iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD), an elegant model for the emergence of cooperation in a multi-agent system.
We observe various types of behavior, cooperation level, and stability, depending on the selection mechanism
and the selection intensity. Hence, our results are important for (1) The proper choice and application of
election schemes when modeling real economic situations and (2) assessing the validity of the conclusions
drawn from computer experiments with these models. We also conclude that the role of selection in the
evolution of multi-agent systems should be investigated further, for instance using more detailed and complex
agent interaction models.
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1. Introduction
Recently, interest in the evolution of strategic choice and the simulation of adaptive agents
has surged among economists and game theorists [2]. We simulate the dynamic behavior of
multi-agent systems with evolutionary algorithms (EAs). EAs are now regarded as a powerful
means for modeling social learning processes occurring in economic multi-agent systems [7].
In an evolutionary context, learning takes place in three dierent steps: (1) learning by imita-
tion (reproduction and selection), (2) communication and exchange of strategic information
(recombining or \crossing over" genetic information), and (3) experimentation (mutation of
the strategies). In this paper we focus on the modeling of agent selection in EAs. An eco-
nomic interpretation of the considered selection schemes is given as well, connecting the elds
of evolutionary computing and agent-based economics.
Our simulations show that the course of evolution in a multi-agent system is sensitive to
the selection intensity, whether the best agents are retained in future generations, and the
stochastic nature of evolutionary processes. These, in turn, indicate the potential sensitivity
of the dynamics and, quite importantly, the level of cooperation in multi-agent systems to
the selection of the individual agents.
The interaction among agents in their ecological \societies" is modeled here with the well-
known iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) game. The IPD game has been studied intensively
in the past (see Section 2), especially to investigate the emergence of cooperation in a society
of selsh agents. We extend previous work by investigating the inuence of evolutionary se-
lection schemes on the dynamics of a population of agents playing the IPD game. In computer
science, many evolutionary selection schemes have already been proposed and evaluated in
the eld of numerical optimization [6]. This eld is chiey concerned with generating opti-
mal solutions for mathematical optimization problems (in which the tness of the evolving
agents is determined by a xed objective function). We, by contrast, focus on processes in
which the tness of the agents depends on the strategies of the other agents in the popu-
lation. These so-called \ecological" problems are of interest, because qualitative aspects of
population dynamics (e.g., the occurrence of transients or the emergence of stable long-term
behavior) become very important.
This paper is organized as follows. First, the prisoner's dilemma is introduced in Section 2.
A brief description of our computational experiments is given in Section 3. Section 4 provides
an overview and discussion of the main results. First, pure selection schemes, in which
all parents are replaced by ospring in the next generation, are analyzed. Then, elitist
models, in which the best agents remain present in the next generation, are evaluated. Both
mean population dynamics and results from individual experiments are included in these
evaluations. Conclusions are given in Section 5.
2. The prisoner's dilemma
The basic prisoner's dilemma (PD) is a two-player game. Both players can choose between
two options: \cooperate" or \defect". If both players cooperate, they receive a reward payo
R; if both defect, they receive a punishment P ; if one player cooperates and the other defects,
the cooperator receives the sucker's payo S and the defector the temptation payo T. To
constitute a PD game, the payos should satisfy T > R > P > S and 2R > S + T . The
payos used in the current experiments, as in most other IPD studies, are T = 5, R = 3,
P = 1 and S = 0 [1, 10, 4, 3, 5].
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An interesting variation of the single-round prisoner's dilemma is the iterated PD (IPD),
in which two players repeatedly play a PD game against each other. Axelrod [1] is the rst
to demonstrate, using a genetic algorithm (GA), that it is possible to simulate the emergence
of robust cooperative behavior in a group of interacting IPD players. Miller [5] uses a GA
to perform similar experiments with co-evolving nite state machines (FSMs). Fogel [3]
evolves a population of FSMs with evolutionary programming techniques. Other important
contributions include Lindgren's [4] ecological experiments with adaptive-memory players
and Yao and Darwen's [10] co-evolutionary simulations of the N -person IPD. However, a
rigorous investigation of the inuence of selection schemes on the evolutionary IPD has not
been performed before.
We show that the particular scheme governing the agents' selection has a strong inuence
on the emergence of cooperation and the stability of the evolving populations. Hence, our
work extends previous results and leads to further insight into the dynamics of multi-agent
systems.
3. Experimental setup
The computer experiments are performed using evolutionary algorithms. These algorithms
are stochastic search methods based upon the principles of natural genetic systems [6]. EAs
deal with a population of individuals (agents). In this paper, simulations are performed
with a population of 60 agents. In each tness evaluation, an agent competes against 12
randomly selected (without replacement) opponents. The tness of an agent is dened as its
mean payo over all played games. To reduce the computational demands, the IPD game is
terminated after 20 rounds.
The IPD strategy of each agent is coded as a bitstring (called a \chromosome") of nite
length. We use the genetic representation of IPD players proposed in [1]. Each agent in
our model has a memory capacity of four previous moves (two of his own and two of the
opponent). The agent's strategy, which species the agent's next move, is then encoded in
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= 16 bits, located on the agent's chromosome. Four additional bits are present to initialize
the agent's memory of past moves at the start of play. Hence, the total chromosome length
is 20.
The EA begins with a randomly generated population. Subsequent populations of the same
size are generated using (1) selection, (2) crossover, and (3) mutation. The dierent selection
schemes studied in this paper are described in detail in Section 4. After the selection phase,
each pair of \parent" agents produces two \ospring", whose chromosomes are determined
by crossing over the parental chromosomes. Finally, the chromosomes are mutated with a
certain (small) probability P
m
. Here, the mutation probability P
m
is set to a value of 0.025
per bit.
4. Results and discussion
Evolutionary selection schemes can be characterized as either generational or steady-state
schemes [8]. We focus on the commonly used generational schemes, in which each population
is replaced in one step by a new population. In the less frequently used steady-state models,
only a small number of agents is replaced each generation.
A further subdivision can be made between pure and elitist selection schemes. Pure selec-
tion schemes (see Section 4.1) allow no overlap between successive generations: all parents
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from generation G
t
are discarded and the next generation G
t+1
is lled entirely with o-
spring from these parents. In elitist schemes, subsequent generations typically do overlap
(see Section 4.2): well-performing parents are transferred to the next generation and only
the badly-performing parents are replaced.
We do not scale our results with respect to the number of function evaluations. This would
be an appropriate procedure in optimization work (where computational eciency is very
important). However, for the ecological processes we study here, the computational eort is
of secondary importance.
4.1 Pure selection schemes
The following selection schemes are considered in this section:
 Canonical genetic algorithms (CGAs). These traditional GA algorithms use tness-
proportional selection of the parents in combination with single-point crossover [6].
The crossover probability P
c
is set to a commonly used value of 0.6. In addition,
comparative studies with other recombination models (e.g., with multiple crossover
points, or with a higher crossover probability) have been performed. The results do not
change signicantly, however, indicating that the ndings presented in this paper are
not very sensitive to this modeling element.
 Tournament selection GAs (TGAs). This is an example of a local selection method.
A random uniform sample of size q > 1 is taken from the population [6]. From this
sample, only the ttest agent is selected to produce ospring. The selection intensity
becomes larger if the tournament size q increases.
We rst consider various CGA variants. Figure 1 shows that no clear population dynamics
emerge if agents are selected to reproduce in proportion to their absolute tness in the
current generation (the CGAa scheme). This global selection method exercises a rather
weak selection intensity. The mean tness of the agents remains close to 2 (in between the
punishment payo P=1 and the reward payo R=3), i.e., the population is neither evolving
to a society of defectors (with a mean tness close to P) or a society of cooperating agents
(with a mean tness close to R).
Axelrod [1] and Miller [5] use a variant of the CGA model called \sigma scaling" [6], in
which the agent's raw tness f
i
is normalized by taking
^
f
i
= (f
i
  )= + , where  is the
population mean tness and  determines the inuence of the agent's relative performance.
Negative tness values (
^
f
i
< 0) are set equal to zero, which means that agents with a tness
more than  standard deviations below the mean get no ospring.
It is important to note several important properties of sigma scaling. First, this selection
method is immune to (strictly increasing) ane transformations of the payo matrix. This
feature is attractive, because players should be able to recalibrate their utility scales without
consequences. Second, problems with negative (raw) tness values (in case of negative payo
values) do not occur using sigma scaling because this method only considers the relative
performance of agents. Third, the selection intensity remains constant during the run because
each agent's tness is scaled with respect to the tness variances in the population.
Results for two dierent values of  are shown in Fig. 1. The  = 1 model (used in [1]) is
labeled as CGAb, and the  = 2 case (see [5]) is labeled as CGAc. Notice the emergence of
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Figure 1: Evolution of the mean population tness using (1) the canonical GA (CGAa) and
(2) sigma scaling of the tness values with  = 1 (CGAb) and  = 2 (CGAc). Notice the
emergence of distinct cooperative behavior if agents are not selected in proportion to their
absolute performance (as in the CGAa model) but in proportion to their relative performance
(as in the CGAb and CGAc models).
a clear population dynamic, which contrasts with results using the previous (CGAa) model.
The mean tness of the population initially decreases toward the punishment level P (=1),
indicating that defecting agents are spreading throughout the population. After approxi-
mately 10 generations, some agents begin reciprocating cooperation (while still punishing
a defecting opponent). The tness of these cooperative agents is signicantly higher than
P , because they receive the reward payo R (=3) whenever they meet each other. Hence,
cooperative agents proliferate and the mean population tness increases.
An important conclusion at this point is that cooperation does not emerge in the IPD
if agents are selected in proportion to their absolute performance, as is done in a classical
selection scheme. Cooperation is established, however, if selection is based upon the relative
performance of the agents. Competition between agents is situated at a global level in these
canonical GAs, because an agent's performance depends on the performance of all other
agents as well.
In the remainder of this section we consider a dierent class of selection schemes: tourna-
ment GAs. This class of selection schemes, in an economic context, is an appropriate model
for a more local selection of agents.
Figure 2 shows results for the TGA scheme for dierent tournament sizes q. Comparing
Fig. 2 with Fig. 1 we see that the TGA scheme with q = 2 yields a population dynamic
similar to the tness-proportional selection schemes based upon relative performance (CGAb
and CGAc). The TGA scheme allows a detailed study of the inuence of the selection
intensity by changing the tournament size q. The selection intensity can be interpreted in
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Figure 2: Evolution of the mean population tness using tournament selection (TGA) with
dierent tournament sizes (q = 2, q = 4, and q = 8). Notice the decrease in long-term tness
if the selection intensity (i.e., the level of competition between agents) becomes very large,
e.g., for q equal to 8.
an economic context as a parameter determining the level of competition between dierent
agents. Increasing the selection intensity by increasing the tournament size q, the mean
long-term tness decreases, see Fig. 2. This implies that, if the selection intensity becomes
very large, populations of agents with high tness (i.e., a high level of cooperation) are being
exploited more successfully by non-cooperative agents.
The results shown in Fig. 2, averaged over 25 experiments, mask a rather unpredictable
population dynamic in individual experiments. As an example, Fig. 3 shows results for ve
individual runs for the TGA selection model (with q = 2). Figure 3 shows that the evolution
of a population strongly depends on the stochastic nature of the evolutionary processes.
Notice, for instance, that, from a random start, the population sometimes converges very
rapidly to a cooperative state (within 20 generations), while in other experiments mutual
cooperation is reached only after 50 generations or more. Once a cooperative society has
been established, it remains vulnerable to invasions of exploiting (non-cooperative) agents -
notice the occasional collapses of the population tness in Fig. 3.
Additional simulations show that the transitions between the two extremal states P and R
occur more frequently if the tournament size q increases. An example is given in Fig. 4, where
the tournament size is increased to q = 8. The increased selection intensity clearly leads to
very unstable behavior of the evolving populations. This implies that, in an economic system,
cooperation between groups of agents is most likely to be stable if the level of competition does
not exceed certain thresholds. But, we observed earlier in the CGAa model that cooperation
does not emerge at all if competition is too weak. Hence, we conclude that stable cooperation
between agents is most likely to emerge in multi-agent systems with an intermediate level of
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Figure 3: Evolution of the mean population tness in ve individual experiments, using the
TGA selection scheme (with q = 2).
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Figure 4: Evolution of the mean population tness if the tournament size q increases to 8
in the TGA selection scheme. Notice the unstable population dynamics in comparison with
Fig. 3.
competition.
It could be conjectured that a loss of diversity in agent types causes the signicant decrease
of evolutionary stability if the selection intensity increases. Experiments with the TGA
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Figure 5: Evolution of the mean population tness for the elitist recombination (ER) scheme
with dierent tournament sizes (q = 1, q = 3, and q = 7).
scheme (with q = 8) show, however, that the number of genotypes present in the population
remains high (on average above 50). Considering that the population size (and hence the
maximum number of dierent genotypes) is equal to 60, it becomes plausible that a loss of
diversity is not the main reason for the observed decrease in evolutionary stability. Indeed, we
doubled the population size from 60 to 120 to increase the population diversity even further,
and again an increasing selection intensity was accompanied by a decreasing evolutionary
stability, as in the experiments with a smaller population size.
4.2 Elitist selection schemes
As an important instance of an elitist model, the elitist recombination (ER) scheme [9] is
considered. In this scheme, the population is rst shued randomly and partitioned in
pairs of parents. Then, each pair of parents creates two ospring, and a local competition
between parents and their ospring is held. Finally, the best two agents of each \family" are
transferred to the next generation. This might be a suitable model for economic selection
at the \family" or group level. In this case, new agents combine strategies of (a pair of)
successful agents in an attempt to outperform them and gain access to the market.
Given the importance attributed to the selection intensity in the previous section, it is
natural to investigate the same issue for elitist schemes. Increasing the selection intensity of
elitist recombination is discussed in [8], where it is proposed to adjust the selection intensity
in the ER scheme by selecting one of the parents in a tournament of size q (whereas the other
parent is still selected at random).
Figure 5 shows the evolution of the mean population tness for this selection scheme for
three dierent tournament sizes q. Previous work [8] shows that the selection intensity of the
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ER (q   1) scheme is equal to the selection intensity of the TGA (q) scheme.
1
We therefore
present results for tournament sizes q of 1, 3, and 7 in Fig. 5. Comparing the results of the
TGA (q = 2) scheme in Fig. 2 with those of the ER (q = 1) scheme, it is clear that an elitist
scheme yields a society of agents with a much higher cooperation level. The long-term tness
decreases somewhat with increasing q in Fig. 5. This eect is, however, relatively small for
this elitist scheme in comparison with pure schemes (see Fig. 2).
Additional experiments show that the sensitivity to stochastic processes decreases if the
agents are selected using an elitist instead of a pure model. In particular, the collapses in
tness, as observed in Figure 3, occur less frequently in individual experiments with the
ER (q = 1) scheme, see Fig. 6. This indicates that emerging cooperative societies are less
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Figure 6: Evolution of the mean population tness for the elitist recombination scheme (ER)
with a tournament size q equal to one. Notice the fast convergence of the evolving populations
towards a very high level of cooperation.
vulnerable to exploitation by defectors if an elitist model governs agent selection.
We have shown in this section that highly-cooperative societies can evolve if the best
performing agents are always retained in the population (\elitism"). Elitism also has an
important stabilizing eect: the mean performance of the agents remains high even if com-
petition becomes intense. This demonstrates that economic systems with a certain degree of
conservatism are less vulnerable to unpredictable behavior and low performance. Also, the
elitist recombination model might be a suitable model for economic selection at the group
or \family" level. In this case a direct competition exists between well-performing \parent"
agents and new \ospring" agents (trying to enter the market by combining the parental
strategies in an innovative manner).
1
Assuming that the heritability factor h
2
is equal to one (for details, see [8]).
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5. Conclusions
We study evolutionary processes in economic multi-agent systems. As an example, we investi-
gate the \evolution of cooperation" in a population of agents playing the (iterated) prisoner's
dilemma (IPD). Computational experiments are performed using evolutionary algorithms
(EAs). Various selection schemes proposed in this eld are evaluated and an economic inter-
pretation of these schemes is given.
Major dierences in population dynamics are observed, depending on the agent selection
mechanism and the level of competition between the agents. In systems without a form
of conservatism (or \elitism"), robust cooperative societies emerge only if the level of com-
petition between the agents is neither too small nor too large. If agent selection is elitist
(when the best agents remain in the population) stable societies of highly-cooperative agents
evolve. These results strongly indicate that a precise modeling of selection processes is of cru-
cial importance when modeling economic situations. The validity of computer experiments
thus critically depends on a correct mapping of real economic processes to more abstract
simulations.
The results presented in this paper are but a rst step in achieving a solid understanding
of the complicated, but fascinating, dynamics of multi-agent systems. Much work has yet to
be done using more detailed agent interaction models.
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